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The past decades have witnessed falling wage shares and a polarization of personal income 
distribution.  Average  wages  and  average  labour  compensation  have  not  kept  up  with 
productivity growth. Functional income distribution has shifted at the expense of labour. In 
many  countries  personal  income  distribution  has  also  become  more  unequal.  By  many 
measures income inequality is worse than at any time in the 20
th century. At the same time 
economic growth processes have become imbalanced. Financial crises have become more 
frequent; household debts have risen sharply; international imbalances have increased, with 
some countries relying excessively on export growth. This paper argues that the polarization 
of  income  distribution  and  the  decline  in  the  wage  share  play  an  important  role  in  the 
generation of imbalanced and unequal growth, and that a pro-labour wage policy will form an 
important part of a policy package that generates a stable growth regime. A wage-led growth 
strategy is thus advocated. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The past decades have witnessed falling wage shares and a polarization of personal income 
distribution.  Average  wages  and  average  labour  compensation  have  not  kept  up  with 
productivity growth. Functional income distribution has shifted at the expense of labour. In 
many  countries  personal  income  distribution  has  also  become  more  unequal.  By  many 
measures income inequality is worse than at any time in the 20
th century. At the same time 
economic growth processes have become imbalanced. Financial crises have become more 
frequent; household debts have risen sharply; international imbalances have increased, with 
some countries relying excessively on export growth. This paper argues that the polarization 
of income distribution and the decline in the wage share play an important role in the 
generation of imbalanced and unequal growth, and that a pro-labour wage policy will form 
an important part of a policy package that generates a stable growth regime. A wage-led 
growth strategy is thus advocated. 
 
The advocacy of a wage-led growth strategy has a long history. It has been articulated in 
reformist  visions  within  the  labour  movement and  was  discussed  under  the  heading  of 
‘underconsumption’ in 19
th century economics. The theory got a boost from the theories of 
effective demand developed by Keynes and Kalecki. The modern theoretical debates on 
wage-led demand based on seminal papers by Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984) and Bhaduri 
and  Marglin  (1990).  The  policy-oriented  concept  of  a  wage-led  growth  strategy  was 
prominently used by UNCTAD (2010). 
 
Section 2 of this paper will provide a  policy-oriented framework for the analysis of the 
interaction  between  distribution  and  growth.  We  will  distinguish  between  distributional 
policies and economic regimes. Pro-labour policies aim at increasing wages, whereas pro-
capital distributional policies aim at suppressing wage growth and increasing profit margins. 
The macroeconomic regime of a country is determined  by the structural features  of its 
economy,  such  as  its  openness  to  international  trade,  its  financial  system  and  the 
characteristics  of  its  welfare  state.  We  will  distinguish  between  wage-led  and profit-led 
economic regimes, or more precisely between wage-led and profit-led demand and supply 
regimes. In a wage-led regime an increase in the wage share has positive effects that mean 3 
 
higher economic activity (in the short run) and faster accumulation of capital (in the long 
run), both through demand-side effects, or faster productivity growth on the supply side. By 
contrast, a profit-led economic regime would occur whenever a decrease in the share of 
wages  or  an  increase  in  the  profit  margins  of  firms  generate  positive  effects  on  the 
economy.  
 
Section 3 investigates the causes of changes in income distribution, in particular the long-
run reduction in the share of wages. Section 4 provides more details as to why an economy 
would exhibit a wage-led economic regime, looking both at supply-side effects,  that is the 
relationship between the share of wages and labour productivity growth, and at demand-
side effects. This section also has a summary of some recent empirical research, providing 
the approximate size of some key effects on the demand side. Section 5 will classify the 
actual  experience  of  key  economies  within this  framework.  In  the  era  of  neoliberalism, 
growth processes have become imbalanced, either relying on growing debt ratios or on 
persistent export surpluses. Two growth processes have emerged: finance-led growth (also 
called  debt-led  growth),  where  growth  was  fuelled  by  increasing  household  debt  made 
possible by asset and property price bubbles and financial engineering (examples are USA, 
UK, Ireland) and export-led growth, where the main engine of growth have been net exports 
(examples  are  Germany,  Japan,  China).  Both  of  these  neoliberal  growth  processes  have 
come with wage suppression. Finally, section 6 highlights a wage-led growth strategy as a 
possible alternative. It combines pro-labour distributional policies with structural policies 
that  are  favourable  to  wage-led  growth.  It  has  the  potential  for  an  equitable  and 
(economically) sustainable growth process. 
 
 
2.  Distribution and growth. A conceptual framework 
 
The relation between distribution and growth had been at the centre of macroeconomic 
analysis in classical economics, but with the dominance of neoclassical economics in the 20
th 
century, issues of distribution have occupied a secondary place, since income distribution 
was  assumed  to  be  regulated  by  marginal  productivity  relations  within  a  perfect 
competition model. In the following we offer a policy-oriented framework to analyse the 4 
 
relation  between  distribution  and  growth.  We  will  contrast  pro-labour  and  pro-capital 
distributional policies and wage-led and profit-led demand and supply regimes. Pro-labour 
policies are distributional policies that shift income distribution in favour of labour. Pro-
capital policies do the opposite. Wage-led and profit-led summarize the economic effects of 
changes  in  income  distribution.  Economic  regimes  therefore,  here,  refer  to  economic 
outcomes that depend on a rich set of institutional determinants.  
 
Income  distribution  is  the  outcome  of  complex  social  and  economic  processes,  but 
governments influence it by means of social policy and labour market policy. We define pro-
capital distributional policies as policies that lead to a decline in the wage share and pro-
labour distributional policies as policies that result in an increase in the wage share. Pro-
capital  distributional  policies  are  often  pursued  under  the  banner  of  promoting  ‘labour 
market  flexibility’  or  wage  flexibility.  They  include  measures  that  weaken  collective 
bargaining institutions (by granting exceptions to bargaining coverage), weakening labour 
unions  (e.g.  by  changing  strike  laws),  lower  minimum  wages,  weaken  employment 
protection legislation.
1 Pro-labour policies are often referred to as strengthening the welfare 
state and labour market institutions and include strengthening collective bargaining (e.g. by 
extending the reach of bargaining agreements to non-unionised firms), strengthening labour 
unions,  increasing  unemployment  benefits ,  and  reducing  wage  and  salary  income 
inequalities. 
 
Of course there are also other factors influencing income distribution, such as technological 
changes, globalisation and financialization. These factors have recently played an important 
role, but we will not elaborate on them here(see section 3), because this section focuses on 
the  interaction  of  distributional  policies  and  economic  regime.  We  will  revisit  the 
determinants of income distribution in the next section.  
 
Table 1. Pro-labour and pro-capital distributional policies 
  Distributional policies  Other factors 
                                                      
1 Here, and in the following, we assume that (effective) labour demand is inelastic (or upward) sloping (for 
empirical evidence see e.g. Rowthorn 1999). Thus an increase in real wages will correspond to an increase in 
the wage share. 5 
 
  Pro-capital  Pro-labour   
Policies   “Labor market flexibility”  
Abolish minimum wages 
Weaken  collective 
bargaining 
“Welfare state” 
Increase minimum wages 
Strengthen  collective 
bargaining 
Changes in technology 
Globalisation 
Financialization  
Results   Weak wage growth  
Wage share ₓ  
Increased wage dispersion 
Rising real wages 
Stable (or ₑ) wage share 
Decreased wage dispersion 
 
 
Next we consider the economic structure. An economic regime is a description of actual 
economic  structures  and  institutions,  including  social  security  provisions,  the  financial 
system in place and the degree of openness of the economy. While the economic regime is 
influenced by various forms of government policy, it should be clear that the nature of the 
economic regime is not a choice variable for economic policy in any straightforward sense. It 
should not be understood as the outcome of policy strategy. We will distinguish between 
wage-led and profit-led economic regimes. Furthermore, following conventional practice we 
will distinguish between demand-side (both in the short run and in the long run) and supply-
side  (long-run)  considerations.  The  key  demand  side  variable  is  the  level  of  aggregate 
demand,  emphasized  by  Keynesian  economists.  The  key  variable  for  the  supply  side  is 
productivity growth. 
 
For our purpose, the question is, first, how aggregate demand reacts to a change in income 
distribution. These effects will be quite complex and are discussed in more depth in section 
4. Here we will focus on extreme cases in order to illustrate our framework. Demand may be 
wage led or profit led. A wage-led demand regime means that an increase in the wage share 
leads to an increase in aggregate demand. The wage-led scenario may arise when higher 
wages lead to higher consumption expenditures (higher consumption sales may then also 
induce higher investment expenditures). Conversely, a profit-led demand regime means that 
an increase in the wage share leads to a decline in aggregate demand. Demand may be 
profit-led if investment is highly sensitive to a reduction in profit margins. High profitability 
(at  a  given  rate  of  capacity  utilization)  may  motivate  firms  to  expand  their  productive 
capacity and increase investment. 6 
 
  
Of course there are many factors other than income distribution that determine aggregate 
demand: monetary policy, fiscal policy, various shocks such as oil price shocks, the bursting 
of a stock market bubble, changes in real exchange rates, changes in the growth rate of 
trade partners, etc. Indeed, for most year-to-year changes, income distribution will only be a 
minor  influence  on  the  determination  of  aggregate  demand,  with  other  developments 
playing a more prominent role. However, if there are long-lasting, deep changes in income 
distribution  as  have  occurred  in  the  last  quarter  century,  they  will  end  up  having  a 
substantial role. 
 
Table 2. Economic structure: wage-led and profit-led demand and supply regimes 
    Demand regime   Supply regime  
Economic 
structure 
Profit-led  Investment  very  sensitive  to 
profit margins   
A  lower  wage  share  leads  to 
higher investment  
Wage  restraint  leads  to 
productivity-enhancing investment  
A  higher  wage  share  leads  to 
lower  GDP  and  slower  capital 
accumulation 
Higher  Real  wage  growth  leads  to 
slower productivity growth 
Wage-led  The propensity to consume  out 
of  wage  income  is  higher  than 
that out of profit income  
Wage  growth  has  strong  positive  
effects  on  labour  effort  and 
productivity  –enhancing 
investments 
A  higher  wage  share  leads  to 
higher  GDP  and  faster  capital 
accumulation 
 
Real  wage  growth  leads  to  faster 
productivity growth 
Other factors  Other sources of demand: 
Government fiscal and monetary policies 
Financial factors: financial asset and real estate price bubbles 
Exchange rate evolution and changes in world demand 
Changes in world commodity prices 
...  
 
Finally, aggregate supply may also be wage led or profit led. The key summary variable for 
the supply side is labour productivity. Productivity will be profit led, if an increase in wages 
discourages productivity-enhancing capital investment and, as a result, the growth of labour 
productivity slows down (most forms of technological progress require capital investment, 7 
 
this  is  called  embodied  technological  progress).  Increases  in  wage  growth  may  have  a 
positive  effect  on  productivity  growth,  if  either  firms  react  by  increasing  productivity-
enhancing investments in order to maintain competitiveness or if workers’ contribution to 
the production process improves. This may be the case either because of improved workers’ 
motivation or, in developing countries, if their health and nutritional situation improves. 
This case is often called the efficiency wage hypothesis, but we may also call it the Webb 
effect,  since  a  positive  causal  relationship  going  from  higher  real  wages  to  higher 
productivity  was  already  proposed  by  Sidney  Webb  (1912),  one  of  the  founders  of  the 
London School of Economics, a long time ago.  
 
A wage-led demand growth regime is a stronger and more long-term concept than wage-led 
demand. While the latter simply implies that an increase in the wage share will lead to an 
increase in aggregate demand or in the rate of capacity utilization, the former additionally 
requires an increase in investment expenditures and productivity growth. Over the long run 
it implies an increase in the rate of accumulation of the capital stock. In contrast, when an 
increase in the wage share implies a decrease in the rate of growth of the capital stock and 
of productivity growth, we then speak of a profit-led demand growth regime.   
 
Table 3 puts the analyses of distributional policies and of economic structures together. For 
simplicity we do not distinguish between demand and productivity regimes, but only discuss 
the economic regime, i.e., we assume that demand and supply react in a similar direction to 
distributional  changes.  This  allows  to  gain  insight  in  the  likely  growth  dynamics  of  the 
different regimes and strategies. Between the two sets of distributional policies and the two 
economic structures, four different combinations are possible. These do have quite different 
properties. If pro-capital distributional policies are pursued in a profit-led economy, this will 
result in a profit-led growth process. Inversely, if pro-labour policies are pursued in a wage-
led economy, this will result in a wage-led growth process. These are the two cells in the 
main diagonal in Table 3. In both cases distributional policies and economic structures are 
consistent. However, if pro-capital policies are pursued in a wage-led economy or if a pro-
labour policies are pursued in a profit-led economy, this will result in stagnation, or more 
likely in practise, will result in unstable growth patterns as growth will  have to rely on 
external stimulation. 8 
 
 
Table 3. Viability of growth regimes  
    Distributional policies 
    Pro-capital  Pro-labour 
Economic structure   Profit-led  Profit-led  growth 
process 
Stagnation or unstable 
growth 
Wage-led  Stagnation or unstable 
growth 
Wage-led  growth 
process 
 
Table 3 is useful in classifying different political ideologies as the four different combinations 
allow to classify  many important arguments. Take the first cell (pro-capital policies in a 
profit-led economy). This scenario corresponds to liberal ideology and what is often called 
the  trickle  down  effect:  higher  profits  are  said  to  lead  to  improved  macroeconomic 
performance. Workers will eventually benefit from wage cuts as higher profit margins will 
lead to investment and growth and rewards will eventually trickle down to workers as well, 
in the form of higher employment rates and higher purchasing power. This scenario could 
be called ‘neoliberalism in theory’’.  
 
Table  4.  Actual  growth  strategies  in  the  economic  structure/distributional  policies 
framework 
    Distributional policies 
    Pro-capital   Pro-labour  
Economic 
structure 
Profit-led  ‘Neoliberalism  in  theory’: 
supply-side  policies  will 
generate aggregate demand 
(‘trickle down theory’) 
‘Doomed social reforms’  
 TINA 
Wage-led   ‘actually  existing 
Neoliberalism’  –  unstable 
and  has  to  rely  on 
exogenous  growth  drivers 
(credit-led growth)  
Postwar social Keynesianism 
  
 
The cell pro-labour policies in a wage-led economy summarizes what many economists (e.g. 
Marglin and Schor 1990) regard as a key characteristic of the postwar era: the expansion of 
the welfare state (in advanced economies) led to a golden age of growth.  9 
 
 
The next cell (pro-labour policies in a profit-led economy) could be called ‘doomed social 
reforms’. It is the scenario that neoliberals claim would happen if progressive social reforms 
were  implemented.  Margaret  Thatcher’s  famous  dictum  ‘there  is  no  alternative’  (TINA) 
makes sense in this cell. Some Marxists use a similar scenario to illustrate the futility of 
attempts to establish a more humane economy within the capitalist mode of production. 
Attempts to raise workers’ consumption or the wage share inevitably lead to a slowdown of 
the economy. 
 
Finally there is the cell pro-capital policies in a wage-led economy. We will argue that this 
describes ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, where two decades of pro-capital distribution 
have resulted in a mediocre economic performance with a heavy reliance on a speculative 
financial sector or on external demand  to achieve growth (see section 5 below).
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The following sections will summarize some  of the available evidence to evaluate which 
scenario describes actual economies.  
 
 
3.  Decline in the wage share. What are the causes? 
 
In the last quarter century dramatic changes in income distribution have taken place. This 
refers to the personal distribution of income as well as to the functional distribution of 
income.
3 Wage shares have fallen in virtually all OECD countries, with decreases typically 
being more pronounced in continental European countries (and Japan) than in the Anglo -
Saxon countries. In the Euro area the (adjusted) wage share has fallen from 72.5 in 198 2 to 
63.3% in 2007 (Fig. 1). Personal income distribution has become more unequal in almost all 
OECD countries (OECD 2008), with the very top income groups increasing their income 
                                                      
2 Although some researchers would argue instead that reliance on free market mechanisms and more flexible 
labour markets have generated large increases in world real income over the last three decades (Balcerowiz 
and Fisher, 2006). But these authors forget to compare the last decades to the evolution of the 1950s and 
1960s. For rich discussions of neoliberalism see Harvey (2003) and Glyn (2006). 
3  Personal  income  distribution  refers  to  the  distribution  of  income  across  households  (or  individuals) 
irrespective of the type of income involved. Functional income distribution refers to the distribution of income 
between wages and capital incomes (usually referred to as ‘profits’).  10 
 
shares substantially in the Anglo Saxon countries, in particular in the USA (Piketty and Saez 
2003; Atkinson et al. 2011). In a multi-country study Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007) 
show that there is a positive correlation between changes in personal and functional income 
distribution.  Overall,  median  real  wage  growth  has  clearly  lagged  behind  productivity 
growth since around 1980. This constitutes a major historical change as wage shares had 
been stable or increasing in the postwar era.  
 




This  has  recently  led  to  a  renewed  interest  in  the  determinants  of  the  distribution  of 
income, with major economic research institutions like the OECD and the IMF publishing 
prominent studies. OECD (2008) documents changes in personal income distribution. IMF 
(2007a)  and  European  Commission  (EC  2007)  investigate  changes  in  functional  income 
distribution and OECD (2007) analyses the wage elasticity of the labour demand function. 
IMF (2007a) and EC (2007) make a strong case that technological change has been the main 
cause  of  changes  in  functional  income  distribution,  that  globalization  (of  trade  and 
production) has also played an important role and, finally, that changes in labor market 
institutions have played a minor role. Technological change is empirically measured as ICT 
(Information  and  Communication  Technology)  investment  or  ICT  services.  The  general 
thrust of the argument is in line with the neoclassical theory of income distribution, which 



































































































Globalization also features prominently in the debate. The standard trade-theory argument 
is built on the Stolper and Samuelson (1941) Theorem, which states that the  abundant 
factor will gain from trade liberalisation. For Northern countries, supposedly, this is capital 
whereas  labor  is  abundant  in  developing  countries  such  as  China  and  India  that  have 
recently entered the global economy. Globalization is thus supposed to benefit capital in the 
north and labor in the south. 
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While the Stolper-Samuleson argument describes a competitive long -run equilibrium, the 
Political Economy of trade approach highlight s distributional effects of globalization in a 
bargaining setting. For example, Rodrik (1997) argues that trade liberalization (even among 
similar countries will affect distribution and will  benefit the more mobile factor, which will 
typically be capital. Unlike the Stolper-Samuelson approach, Rodrik’s argument is set in a 
bargaining framework. The change in distribution takes place because of a redistribution of 
rents, not because of the equalization of factor costs. Moreover, in the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem one would expect distribution to change after production has been relocated. In 
contrast, Epstein and Burke (2001) argue that due to threat effects redistribution can take 
place without changes in production locations.   
 
While there are differences in the theoretical arguments the empirical assessment is rather 
clear. All studies find substantial effects of globalization on functional income distribution. 
For example IMF (2007a) concludes “globalization is one of several factors that have acted 
to reduce the share of income accruing to labor in advanced economies” (IMF 2007a, 161). 
 
                                                      
4 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes that firms have not market power and that neither capital nor labor 
are mobile; its effects take place through trade in competitive equilibrium. However, the recent period of 
globalization has been marked by an increase in capital mobility. “If capital can travel across borders, the 
implications  of  the  theorem  weaken  substantially”  (EC  2007,  45).  Moreover,  classical  international  trade 
theory is unable to explain the actual pattern of trade, which takes place mostly among developed countries. 
According to standard trade theory it is not obvious why North-North trade should affect income distribution 
(assuming that relative factor prices are similar). Second, labor is not a homogenous input. While unskilled 
labor (in the North) may lose from globalization, skilled labor may indeed gain. If so, it is a priori not clear how 
the total wage share in the North should be affected. 12 
 
A third set of factors that influence income distribution is financial deregulation (or more 
broadly speaking, financialization).
5 Financial deregulation has had two important effects on 
the bargaining position of labor. First, firms have gained more options  for investing: they 
can invest in financial assets as well as in real assets and they can invest at home as well as 
abroad. They have gained mobility in terms of the geographical location as well as in term of 
the content of investment. Second, it has empowered shareholders relative to workers. The 
development of a market for corporate control has aligned management’s interest to that 
of  shareholders  (Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan  2000,  Stockhammer  2004).  Rossmann  (2009) 
illustrates this with reference to private equity funds, which buy firms by way of debt that is 
transferred to the firm. The surplus is siphoned to the private equity fund through dividend 
payments or fees. The restructured firms then are heavily burdened with servicing their 
debt  and  have  little  alternative  to  pursuing  an  aggressive  cost-cutting  strategy.  For 
countries,  where  data  is  available,  the  increase  in  dividend  payout  is  well  documented 
(Duménil and Lévy 2001). Power et al (2003) document the increasing income share of 
rentiers.  
 
So far few econometric studies on changes in functional income distribution have included 
financialization  variables.  ILO  (2008)  argues  that  “financial  globalization  has  led  to  a 
depression of the share of wages in GDP” (ILO 2008, 39), but does not provide evidence. 
Jayadev (2007) analyses the effect of financial openness and trade openness on the wage 
share in an econometric analysis covering up to 80 countries for the period 1970-2001. The 
openness variables are legal measures on openness. Capital account openness and trade 
openness are found to have negative effects on the wage share. Remarkably, IMF (2007b) in 
a  study  on  personal  income  distribution  within  countries  has  included  foreign  direct 
investment (FDI) stocks.  
 
In  a  detailed  study  attempting  to  replicate  and  extend  IMF  (2007a)  and  EC  (2007) 
Stockhammer (2009) finds that the results for technological change are not robust, whereas 
the effects of globalisation are confirmed. He then extends the estimation specifications to 
                                                      
5  Financialization  refers  to  the  increased  influence  of  financial  institutions  and  financial  motives  on  non-
financial activities. 13 
 
include a measure for financial globalisation and allows for different effects of trade union 
density  in  countries  where  trade  union  membership  is  a  precondition  for  receiving 
unemployment  benefits.  He  finds  that  financial  globalisation  has  strong  effects  and  the 
organisational strength of labour unions has a robust effect.  
 
 
4.  Economic effects of a declining wage share 
 
While the previous section has discussed the causes of the decline in the wage share, this 
section turns to its effects. It is standard in economic theory to distinguish between the 
demand-side  and  supply-side  effects.,  where  demand  effects  refer  to  changes  in 
expenditures  for  a  given  productive  capacity  and  technology,  while  supply-side  effects 
involve changes in machinery and technology. The key summary variable for the supply side 
is  (the  growth  of)  labour  productivity.  We  will  follow  the  same  distinction  here,  being 
understood, as was pointed out in the second section, that demand effects can spill over to 
the growth rate of capital accumulation.
 6 
 
4.1 Demand effects 
 
What are the effects of change in the wage share on aggregate demand? Aggregate demand 
consists of private consumption expenditures , investment expenditures, net exports  and 
government expenditures. In the following we focus on the reaction of the private sector 
and treat government expenditures as an exogenous policy variable.  
 
A change in income distribution will have several effects on the components of demand that 
pull  in  different  directions.  First,  consumption  expenditures  are  likely  to  be  a  positive 
function  of  the  wage  share.  Higher  wages  will  typically  lead  to  higher  consumption 
expenditures because wage earners normally have a higher propensity to consume than 
                                                      
6 Mainstream economics regards demand effects as purely short-run effects as it regards the economy to be 
strongly  anchored  in  a  supply-determined  equilibrium  to  which  the  economy  will  return.  Keynes,  who 
pioneered  the  analysis  of  demand  formation,  was  rather  sceptical  of  long-run  analysis.  Post-Keynesian 
economics, built on the works of  Keynes, Kalecki and Steindl, highlight that aggregate demand plays a crucial 
role even in the long run.  14 
 
recipients of capital income. This is because workers are typically poorer than capitalists (or 
other recipients of capital income).  Furthermore, a large proportion of gross profits are 
saved by firms in the form of retained earnings. The size of this income distribution effect 
will depend on the difference in income between capital and labour, on the social security 
system, which influences savings rates, but also on other features such as house prices and 
capital  gains  on  the  stock  market.    Second,  investment  expenditures  are  likely  to  react 
negatively to an increase in the wage share, i.e., to a decrease in the profit share (for a given 
level of national income). From an intuitive point of view, a reduction in the profit share for 
a given level of national income implies that the profit margins of firms have gone down.  
Since  expected  future  profits  ought  to  be  an  important  stimulant  for  investment,  a 
reduction in profit margins, i.e., a reduction in the profit rate assessed at normal rates of 
utilization of capacity ought to have a negative effect on investment.  The precise effect will 
depend on the structure and liquidity of the financial system and on what Keynes called the 
psychology  of  the  investor,  e.g.  after  a  financial  crisis  firms  may  be  reluctant  to 
investbecause of increased uncertainty. Thirdly, net exports are likely to react negatively to 
increases in the wage share because, for a given exchange rate, the increase in the wage 
share will decrease profits margin and/or make exports less competitive abroad. The size of 
this effect will depend on the degree of openness of the economy and the types of products 
that the economy is importing and exporting. 
 
The effects on the three aggregates thus pull in different directions. An increase in the wage 
share is likely to increase consumption, but decrease investment and net exports. The net 
effect  is  not  clear  a  priori,  but  will  depend  on  the  relative  size  of  these  effects.  If  the 
consumption effect is stronger than the investment and net export effects then the overall 
effect  is  positive  and  the  economy  is  in  a  wage-led  demand  regime.  Conversely,  if 
investment and net exports react more strongly, the overall effect of an increase in the 
wage  share  on  demand  is  negative  and  the  demand  regime  is  called  profit  led.  This 
distinction is  based  on the theoretical  work  of  Bhaduri and  Marglin  (1990)  and  Blecker 
(1989).  
 
Note that the model outlined above includes net exports. One country’s exports are some 
other country’s imports. This raises the possibility of a fallacy of composition: while each 15 
 
individual country can increase its demand by exporting more, not all countries can do so at 
the same time. The world economy overall is a closed economy. It is thus interesting to look 
at  the  domestic  effect and  the  total  effects  (i.e.,  including  net  exports)  separately.  The 
domestic effects only include the effects on consumption and investment and should be 
interpreted as a scenario when the change in the wage share affects all trading partners 
simultaneously. It can be thought of a change in the world wage share. 
 
Regarding the consumption behaviour, the saving differential between rich and poor is well 
established  empirically.  As  an  illustration  Table  5  reports  the  saving  rates  for  different 
income groups for Germany. In 1995 the bottom quarter of the income distribution had 
saving rate of 7.3%, whereas the richest quarter had as saving rate of 13.8%. Saving rates 
clearly increase with income level. Germany experienced a dramatic increase in inequality in 
the last decades. This also affects different saving propensities. In 2007 the lowest quartile 
had a saving rate of 4.1% whereas the richest quartile had a saving propensity of 15.8%. 
 
Table 5. Saving rates by income group for Germany 
  1995  2001  2007 
bottom quartile  7.3  5.4  4.1 
3
rd quartile   9.5  9.3  8.0 
2
nd quartile   11.3  10.1  9.0 
top quartile   13.8  13.1  15.8 
Source: Stein (2011) based on SOEP (Socio-Economic Panel) data 
 
These models have recently inspired a rich empirical literature trying to identify demand 
regimes by econometric means. Table 6 gives an overview of the empirical results. These 
studies differ by the countries and time period covered as well as by the method employed 
(see Hein and Vogel 2008 Table 1 and Stockhammer and Stehrer 2011 for more extensive 
discussions)  and  are  thus  difficult  to  compare.  Overall  the  majority  of  studies  find that 
domestic demand regimes tend to be wage-led, whereas international trade turns many 
economies into a profit-led regime.  
 16 
 
Table 6. Econometric studies on wage-led and profit-led demand regimes 
  Domestic Demand   Total Demand  
  wage-led   Profit-led   wage-led   Profit-led  
Euro area   SOE09     SOE09    
Germany   BB95,  NS07,  HV08, 
SHG11, SS11  
  NS07, HV08, SHG11   BB95  
France   BB95,  NS07,  SE07,  HV08, 
SS11  
  (SO04), NS07, HV08   BB95, SE07  
NL   NS07, SS11   HV08   NS07   HV08  
Austria   SE08, HV08, SS11         SE08, HV08  
UK   BB95, NS07, HV08   SS11   BB95, NS07, HV08    
Japan   BB95   NS07     BB95, NS07  
USA   BB95,  HV08,  OSG12, 
(SS11)  
NS07   BB95, HV08, OSG12   (SO04),  NS07, 
BFT06  
Note. Reference in brackets denote statistically insignificant results. 
BB95: Bowles and Boyer 1995; BFT08: Barboso-Filho and Taylor 2006; ES07: Ederer and Stockhammer 2007; 
HV08:  Hein  and  Vogel  2008;  NS07  Naastepad  and  Storm  2006-07;  OSG12:  Onaran  et  al.  2012;  SO04: 
Stockhammer  and  Onaran  2004;  SE08:  Stockhammer  and  Ederer  2008;  SHG11:  Stockhammer  et  al  2011; 
SOE09: Stockhammer et al 2009; SS11: Stockhammer and Stehrer 2011 
 
To illustrate the orders of magnitude involved Table 7 summarizes the results for a large, 
relatively closed economy, the Euro area and for a small open economy, Austria (based on 
Stockhammer  et  al  2009  and  Stockhammer  and  Ederer  2008  respectively).  A  1%-point 
increase in the wage share would lead to an increase in consumption by 0.37 (%-points of 
GDP)  in the  Euro  area and  0.36  in  Austria.  Investment  would  decline by  0.07  and 0.15 
respectively. Domestic demand is wage led in both cases (by .3 in the EU12 and .21 in 
Austria). The net export effect is -0.09 in the EU12, but -0.39 in Austria. The total demand 
regime is thus wage led in the EU (a 1%-pt increase in the wages share leads to a .21%-pt 
increase in demand), but profit led in Austria (-0.18).
7 
 
                                                      
7 While I consider these values plausible, other researchers disagree. Naastepad and Storm (2006/07) tend to 
find much higher investment effects and much lower net export effects. These results are based on single-
equation estimators. Systems estimators tend to find stronger profit effects (Barbosa -Filho and Taylor 2006, 
Flaschel and Proano 2007). My experience is that the consumption effect is rather reliable, though often rather 
small in Anglo-Saxon countries. Investment effects are usually very sensitive to the exact specification of the 
estimation equation. This is probably because profits and demand are highly correlated and investment is a 
highly pro-cyclical variable itself. The net export effect depends on assumptions about the exchange rate. 
Several early studies did not allow for globalisation to affect the wage-sensitivity of exports. Two concluding 
comments on the literature need to be made: first, the simultaneity issue between distribution and demand 
lurks unresolved in the background. Second, the set of control variables controlling for other factors is rather 
limited in most estimations. 17 
 
Table 7 
  Effects on private excess demand (in % of GDP) 
    EU 12 
(openness <15%) 
Austria 
(openness > 50%) 
Consumption   0.37  0.36 
Investment   -0.07  -0.15 
Domestic sector   0.30  0.21 
Net exports   -0.09  -0.39 
Total effect   0.21  -0.18 
Source: EU12 Stockhammer et al 2009; Austria: Stockhammer and Ederer 2008 
 
These results have important policy implications for regional economic integration. Take the 
Euro area as an example. As elsewhere, wage shares have fallen drastically in the Euro area. 
This has been encouraged by the European Commission, which has advocated a strategy of 
improving  competitiveness  for  a  long  time  (European  Commission  1995,  1996,  1997). 
Indeed  many  European  countries  have  implemented  ‘wage  pacts’  that  combine  wage 
restraint with other policy measures (Schulten 2002). The results in Table 7 illustrate an 
important economic difference between the Euro area and its member states. While many 
member states are small open economies, in which a wage restraint may boost demand via 
exports, the Euro area as a whole is a large, relatively closed economy. Most trade of Euro 
member states takes place within the Euro area. A wage cut in the Euro area will increase 
net exports, but domestic demand will shrink by more. Wage policy is thus in a prisoners’ 
dilemma-type situation. For individual member states wage restraint may be an attractive 
strategy,  but  if  everyone  pursues  it,  it  will  have  negative  effects.  European  wage 
coordination would, at least in principle make it easier to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma 
and internalize the externalities of wage agreements (Stockhammer 2008, Hein and Truger 
2004). However, the differences in wage bargaining systems make this difficult in practise.  
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4.2 Supply side effects 
 
On the supply side, the key question is how changes in the wage share or in real wages 
affect productivity growth (or more broadly speaking, technological progress). Mainstream 
economists typically argue that competitive markets are most conducive to growth and, in 
the  next  step,  argue  for  labour  market  (and  product  market)  deregulation.  Critical 
economists highlight that labour market institutions can not only have positive social effects 
as they help overcome market failures, but they also may have positive effects on economic 
growth because good labour relations will improve the propensity of workers to contribute 
to the production process.  
 
Recently,  this  has  inspired  several  empirical  studies.  Storm  and  Naastepad  (2009) 
investigate labour market institutions in twenty OECD countries. They find that relatively 
regulated and coordinated (‘rigid’) institutions lead to higher productivity growth. Hein and 
Tarassow (2010) analyse the link between income distribution and productivity growth for 
six OECD economies by means of time series analysis and report that higher profit shares 
have a negative effect on productivity growth. Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2011) perform a 
panel analysis for OECD countries from 1960 to 2004 and find that higher wage growth leads 
to higher productivity growth. They interpret this as implying that stronger labour market 
institutions lead to faster long-run growth. These studies face challenges in identifying the 
direction of causality and the distinction between short-run and long-run effects; and more 
research is certainly needed. However, it seems fair to conclude that the available evidence 
does  not  suggest  that  real  wage  growth  has  any  negative  long-run  effect  on  labour 
productivity growth. 
 
Wages have a dual function in capitalist economies. They are a cost of production as well as 
a source of demand. An increase in the wage share has several effects on demand and 
whether actual demand regimes are wage led or profit led is subject to an ongoing academic 
debate. Our interpretation of the available evidence is that domestic demand regimes are 
likely to be wage led in most economies. In open economies the net export effects may 
overpower the domestic effects and total demand in many individual countries may well be 
profit led. However, countries trade among each other. Larger geographical (or economic) 19 
 
areas are therefore likely to be wage led. The world economy overall is probably in a wage-
led demand regime. There is comparatively less research on the supply-side effects of an 
increase in the wage share. However, there are several studies that find positive effects of 
wage  increases  on  productivity  growth,  suggesting  that  the  long-term  effects  of  wage 
expansion are unlikely to be harmful. 
 
 
5.  Classifying recent growth regimes and strategies: credit-led growth, export-led 
growth or wage-led growth 
 
Neoliberalism came with the promise that deregulation of goods markets, labour markets 
and financial markets would lead to higher growth and increased welfare. Higher inequality 
was to be accepted because it yields economic benefits. In our terminology, neoliberalism 
posited a strongly profit-led economic regime. But Neoliberalism has failed to deliver on its 
promise. Growth rates in the allegedly overregulated postwar era were higher than in the 
neoliberal phase. Deregulation did indeed generate increased inequality, but without much 
of the benefits that were supposed to come with it.  
 
But if the world economy is indeed wage led, how did neoliberal economies grow at all? 
Neoliberalism, in practice, has operated in the south-east cell of Tables 3 and 4, pursuing a 
strategy  based  on  pro-capital  distributional  policies,  but  within  an  essentially  wage-led 
economic structure. Such a strategy will lead either to stagnation – or it has to rely on 
external  factors  for  stimulating  growth.  Indeed  the  latter  is  what  has  characterized  the 
performance of what we might call ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. Instead of generating a 
robust  growth  path  based  on  the  profit-investment  link,  growth  has  relied  on  either 
financial bubbles and rising indebtedness (in short, finance-led growth) or it has relied on a 
mercantilist strategy based on export surpluses (Stockhammer 2011, Horn and van Treeck 
2011). Boom-bust cycles driven by stock markets, property markets or capital flows have 
been a key feature of actually existing neoliberalism: the Latin American crises of the 1980s 
and  of  the  mid  1990s  (the  Peso  crisis),  the  EMS  (European  Monetary  System)  crisis 
(1992/93), the South East Asia crisis (1997/98), the dot.com bubble burst 2000/01 and the 
Great Recession of 2008/09. 20 
 
 
To understand this pattern one has to appreciate the central role of financial deregulation 
for the neoliberal growth model. Financial deregulation has allowed financial innovation and 
has given rise to speculative boom bust cycles and, over long periods, to increasing debt 
levels  for  financial  institutions  and  households.  Booms  on  stock  markets  and  property 
markets often attract capital inflows that fuel the bubbles further (Reinhart and Reinhart 
2008). But the liberalization of capital flows also means that some countries will have to 
have current account surpluses and net capital outflows. International financial deregulation 
thereby has given rise to two symbiotic growth models: a credit-led growth model (with 
capital inflows) and an export-led model (with capital outflows). While growth has been 
driven  by  consumption  growth  fuelled  by  rising  household  debt  in  the  Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and especially in the leading country, the USA, other countries have subdued 
domestic  demand,  including  that  arising  from  the  government  sector,  and  have  heavily 
relied on net exports as the key growth engine.  
 
While admittedly not all countries fit this dichotomy of credit-led and export-led growth 
models neatly, it is useful as it captures an important part of the dynamics behind the 
growing international imbalances and it highlights that both models compensate for a lack 
of  domestic  demand.  Both  growth  models  have  occurred  in  centre  as  well  as  in  the 
periphery. In particular in Europe the central countries (Germany and its smaller cousins) 
have features of export-led growth, whereas the peripheral countries within the Euro zone 
have had credit-led growth. Table 8 gives a stylized classification of important countries. 
 
Table 8. Growth models of actually existing Neoliberalism 
  Credit-led  Export-led 
Centre  US, UK  Germany, Austria, Japan 
Periphery  Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain  China 
 
Two  statistics  will  help  substantiate  the  usefulness  of  the  distinction  in  credit -led  and 
export-led economies. First, Table 9 gives the increase in household debt (as % of GDP) in 
major European economies and the USA (comparable data for Japan and China were not 
readily available). While household debt declined in Germany by 11.34%-points of GDP from 21 
 
2000 to 2008, it grew by a modest 7.9%-points in Austria, but it grew by well above 25%-
points in the credit-led group. In the USA and the UK it grew by 26%-points and 28.13%-
points respectively. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, household debt increased by 35.46, 37.38 
and 33.84%-points. In Ireland it even grew by a staggering 62.72%-points.  
 
Table 9. Increase in household debt, 2000-2008 
Germany   -11.34  USA  26 
Netherlands  32.83  UK  28.13 
Austria  7.91  Ireland  62.72 
    Greece  35.46 
    Spain  33.84 
    Italy  18.32 
    Portugal  27.38 
Source: Eurostat: Financial Flows and Stocks by Sector; USA: Flows of Funds; Ireland starts 2001 instead of 
2000 
 
It turns out that those countries with rising household debt, with few exceptions, have also 
been the countries that ran current account deficits, whereas those with little changes in 
household indebtedness have been the countries with current account surpluses.
8  
 
Table 10. International imbalances: current account as % of GDP, 2007 
Germany   7.9   United Kingdom   -2.7  
Austria   3.6   United States   -5.2  
Netherlands   8.7          
        Greece   -14.5  
Japan   4.8   Ireland   -5.3  
China   5.2   Spain   -10.0  
        Portugal   -9.4  
    Italy   -2.4  
Source: OECD 
 
In 2007, i.e., before the financial crisis, Germany and Austria had current account surpluses 
of  7.9%  and  3.6%  (of  GDP)  respectively,  while  Japan  and  China  had  current  account 
surpluses of 4.8% and 5.2%. On the other hand the USA and the UK had deficits of 5.2% and 
                                                      
8 In a sense, this is not unexpected, since by identity, as pointed out in particular by the late Wynne Godley, 
domestic household net borrowing + corporate net borrowing + public borrowing = current account deficit.  22 
 




Actually existing neoliberalism has not led to a growth process via investment. Rather it has 
relied on other factors for growth. Rising household debt has temporarily made up for wage 
growth (Barba and Pivetti 2009) in the credit-led growth model; increasing trade surpluses 
have been the growth engine of a second group of countries, that have followed an export-
led growth model. Both  of these  growth models are not sustainable. Fi nancial bubbles 
eventually  burst  and  debt s  have  to  be  service d  and  possibly  repaid  (for  otherwise, 
bankruptcy occurs), while export-led growth relies on other countries to import and leads to 
the impoverishment of the importing countries and to growing international imbalances. 
 
 
6.  Wage-led growth – a viable economic strategy 
 
But there is an alternative to neoliberalism. If, as we have argued, the world economy (and, 
indeed,  large  countries and  or  economic  blocks)  are  indeed  wage  led,  then  a  wage-led 
growth strategy is a viable option. A wage-led growth strategy would have to combine pro-
labour distributional social and labour market policies with a regulation of the financial 
sector.  
 
Distributional policies that increase the wage share and reduce wage dispersion include 
increasing or establishing minimum wages, strengthening social security systems, improving 
union legislation and increasing the reach of collective bargaining agreements. All of these 
are against orthodox economic wisdom and, under the perceived pressure to reduce budget 
deficits, economic policy is recently moving in the opposite direction. However, in times of 
crisis and a lack of effective demand, what economies need is more state involvement, not 
less. A successful policy package to economic recovery will also have sustained wage growth 
                                                      
9 With the exception of Ireland current account positions and net export positions are similar. Ireland, in past 
decades, has had current account deficits, but net export surpluses. This is because of the large amount of 
repatriated profits, thus leading to a large discrepancy between GDP and GNP. 23 
 
as one of its core building blocks. Only when wages grow with productivity growth will 
consumption expenditures grow without rising debt levels. 
 
To be successful a modern version of a wage-led growth strategy will require a restructuring 
of the financial sector. The deregulated financial sector has fuelled speculative growth and 
resulted in the worst recession since the 1930s. If a repeat of the crisis is to be prevented, 
this will require  managing  international capital flows, a re-focussing of the financial sector 
on narrow banking, the elimination of destabilizing financial innovations, and a higher fiscal 
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